blacklisting · Employment Rights Act 1996 · Employment Tribunal · Unfair Dismissal

Tribunal victory for Unite rep blacklisted by construction bosses ‘draws line in the sand’

blacklist-zebraReposted from the Unite website:

A Unite workplace rep, who was blacklisted by his employer Interserve Industrial Services because of his union activities while working at a power station at Runcorn, Cheshire, has won his employment tribunal (ET) case for unfair dismissal.

Unite, the country’s largest union, hailed this as ‘a great victory which draws a line in the sand’ for construction industry bosses who victimise union representatives.

John Kelly, a rigger/erector who worked for three years at the energy-from-waste power station being built at Runcorn, was awarded a total of £3,253.11 by the Liverpool tribunal for unfair dismissal (£2,003.11) and damages for injured feelings (£1,250).

The tribunal decided that as the work at Runcorn was coming to an end in July 2014, John Kelly – described as ‘a good worker with considerable experience’ –  was not offered work at the Capenhurst site, also in Cheshire, because he was a workplace representative and a member of Unite.

The judgement  stated that Unite regional officer Steve Benson was ‘a credible and believable witness’, while the construction manager, Trevor Collins, responsible for hiring new labour, had made Facebook entries to his friends, expressing his dislike for the ‘Liverpudlian elements’ in the workforce – a large percentage of whom were from Liverpool.

The judgement stated: “The tribunal did not find it credible that the claimant (John Kelly) had been considered for vacant positions by Trevor Collins.

“In short, Trevor Collins did not want the claimant (an employee representative for Unite and activist) working on the Capenhurst project under his management, he was motivated by the claimant’s membership of Unite and his known activities in that capacity.”

Unite assistant general secretary Gail Cartmail said: “Unite will not tolerate abuse by employers of our elected representatives. This successful employment tribunal decision shows Unite will not suffer in silence while employers try to stifle our voice on construction sites.

“This is a great victory which draws a line in the sand for construction industry employers who are tempted to victimise and blacklist our members for carrying out legitimate trade union activities.

“We welcome Labour’s pledge to outlaw the odious practice of blacklisting once and for all.

“Tomorrow (Tuesday 28 April) workers across the world mark International Workers’ Memorial Day when we remember the dead and fight for the living. Unite reps are workers frontline defence against hazardous working conditions and deserve to be applauded not victimised for their efforts”.

John Kelly said: “I feel very pleased that I took this company on with the help of Unite, as this shows that bad employers can be stood up to and be defeated. The main reason was to show other lads and shop stewards we are getting blacklisted and we should stand up for our rights.”

John Kelly was dismissed in April 2014, but subsequently found work with another company unconnected with this case.

Unite director of legal, affiliated services & membership Howard Beckett said: “This is a fine example of how Unite’s legal services fight – and is successful – on behalf of our 1.4 million members. It shows the strong benefits of belonging to a trade union to obtain representation. We would like to thank the efforts of EAD Solicitors in bringing John Kelly’s case to a successful conclusion.”

Read the full ET judgment [PDF]

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Disability · Equality Act 2010 · Misconduct · Reasonable Adjustments

Disability and Disciplinary Dismissals

disabilityIn recent weeks the Employment Appeal Tribunals judgement in Thomson v Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust has been published. The key issue which has been attracting comment is the endorsement of the first tier tribunal’s decision that a dismissal may be unfair because of the choice of the decision maker, even when there is no accusation of bias, and the choice of the decision maker was entirely consistent with the employer’s disciplinary decision.

The decision is an important one to which I may return to in in a later article; however, the case also concerned a complaint of disability discrimination.The decision on this point is not ground-breaking in legal terms but it does I think raise some helpful issues for employee representatives dealing with disciplinary proceedings where disability is alleged to be a factor.

The claimant was a Consultant Neonatologist who was dismissed for bullying colleagues. She was at the time of the misconduct subject to a formal warning for misconduct but was dismissed for gross misconduct so the prior warning had little significance for the case. The claimant was also claimed she was disabled by reason of her dyslexia which the Respondent conceded at a Case Management Discussion. During the proceedings the claimant sought to suggest she was disabled by reason of her dyslexia and depression and following an amendment to the claim the claimant made a complaint that the Respondent had failed to make a reasonable adjustment for the claim.

The claimant alleged that the Respondent operated a “a practice of normally dismissing in the case of conduct found to be gross misconduct.” This was the provision, criterion or practice required by section 20(3) of the Equality Act 2010 that was alleged to place the claimant at a substantial disadvantage. The main contour of the allegation is found in the ET’s determination of this complaint, which is cited in paragraph 14 of the EAT’s determination:

Did the (valid) PCPs put the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who were not disabled?  We have reminded ourselves of the wording of paragraph 48 of the amended Grounds of Appeal (quoted above).  The comparative disadvantage was said to arise from the alleged fact that the Claimant’s disability made her more likely to be found guilty of conduct amounting to or perceived as bullying.  That is to say more likely than persons who were not disabled.  Essential to the argument is the stated link between dyslexia and/or neurodiversity (the disability or disabilities pleaded) and the behaviour liable to amount, or be perceived as amounting, to bullying.  In our judgment, the insurmountable difficulty confronting Mr O’Dair is that the link is simply not made out.  Dr Harrison’s evidence in answer to Dr Mitchell’s first question was very clear (see above).  He makes no connection between dyslexia or neurodiversity and bullying behaviour or conduct which might be seen as harassment.  Nor does Dr Roberts offer any support for Mr O’Dair’s theory.  Subtle problems of perception and misreading of verbal cues are a world away from the sort of behaviour of which the Claimant was accused.  As the case progressed Mr O’Dair appeared to seek to overcome these difficulties by focusing on the evidence of Professor Harrison pointing to incipient depression.  But the obvious answer to that is that we are not dealing with a disability discrimination case based on depression.  No such complaint is before us.

 Dr Harrison’s answer referred to above was in respect to the question posed which was in “your opinion is it likely that the bullying and harassing behaviour are due to dyslexia?”. Dr Harrison’s answer was “I am unaware that dyslexia per se is considered to be a cause of bullying and harassment.  Indeed, I would say that the opposite is more likely to be the case, ie people with dyslexia may be the victims of bullying by others. Dyslexia may be associated with other conditions.  This has been termed neurodiversity.  Examples of other conditions include dyspraxia, dyscalculia, ADHD and Autism Spectrum Disorder. … As a consequence of having neurodiversity, low self esteem may develop leading to depression and anxiety.  People who are increasingly anxious or depressed may behave erratically and may display irritability and short temper and lack of tolerance of others.”

The EAT dispatched with this case quickly (and in my view correctly) as follows (paragraph 24):

So far as depression is concerned, on which Mr O’Dair places considerable reliance for his aggregation argument, on the evidence placed before the Tribunal we see from the later letter of 25 July 2012 from Professor Harrison to Mr Kuku, the BMA representative Senior Employment Advisor acting for the Claimant, the Professor’s  view of the Claimant’s anxiety was as follows:

“… Based on my own assessment, I had formed the view that she had developed an adjustment disorder including anxiety and depression.  Although I have not had contact with the MedNet psychiatrist, it appears that there is an external opinion that Merran is suffering from severe stress and reactive depression.  In my judgement I think this is due to the effect of the investigations that have taken place, the outcome of the first investigation which placed her on a final warning and concerns that more complaints have been made about her. …”

That is a clear opinion expressed that any anxiety and depression observed in the Claimant was caused by the processes which led to her dismissal.  In other words the investigations into her conduct and what happened thereafter.  They do not, in our judgment, lend support to a suggestion that the Employment Tribunal erred in failing to hold that the Claimant was suffering from depression at the material time, whether or not that was to be relied on as constituting the disability for the purpose of their claim before them standing on its own alongside the dyslexia or as amalgamated with it, as in the Patel case, resulting from dyslexia.  On the evidence before the Tribunal, in particular Professor Harrison’s letter of 25th July 2012, on whose previous letter considerable reliance was placed, Professor Harrison was of the view that such anxiety and depression was caused by the inquiry into the complaints against the Claimant and was not present at or before the events which led to the inquiry.

In short, the claimant’s disability, dyslexia, could not be held to have been a made the claimant more prone than she would have been but for her disability to result is misconduct action (and in turn dismissal) proceedings being instituted against her. Therefore, the link between the claimant’s disability and the alleged substantial disadvantage (greater likelihood of being dismissed) was simply not made out. In passing even if the link was made out is would appear to me that, following Griffiths v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions the claimant would still have been unsuccessful since substantial disadvantage could not be established since a non disabled employee would also have been dismissed in such circumstances. That is a fundamentally unfair provision and one can only hope that the appeal against the EAT’s decision in Griffiths is overturned when the Court of Appeal comes to issue its judgement on the appeal (heard in February I understand).

As I have written before there may be cases (and even cases of criminal misconduct) where a finding of deliberate or intentional wrongdoing owing to disability cannot be sustained and, therefore, a finding of gross misconduct is impermissible. These are likely to be rare, however.

Trade union reps are much more likely to encounter situations where a disabled person may be more likely to resort engage in misconduct offences than they would but for their disability. In such cases there are potential arguments of failure to make adjustments, discrimination arising from disability and indirect discrimination.

An example would be precisely the type of case alluded to in the medical evidence in Thomson. A person on the Auspergers Spectrum can sometime have difficulty in interpersonal relationships. This disadvantage, especially in times of heightened stress, can lead to raised voices and comments being made in anger/exasperation. I have seen this type of situation result in disciplinary proceedings.

It is in this context that the Thomson judgement serves as a useful reminder to reps. What seems apparent was the EAT had no difficulty accepting that a normal practice to dismiss was a provision, criterion or practice for the purposes of the duty to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act 2010 (and by implication also under section 19 of the Act). And so, where a person’s disability has an effect on their conduct but not to the extent where it gives a complete defense on culpability grounds (as in Burdett) there is still the prospect, even if a non disabled person would be dismissed for the same act for a claim to be made the application of that practice represented a failure to make adjustments and/or indirect discrimination.

Case references:

Thomson v Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust [2015] UKEAT 0218_14_3001

Griffiths v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions EAT/0372/13

Burdett v Aviva Employment Services Ltd [2014] UKEAT 0439_13_1411

Fair Investigation · Misconduct · Unfair Dismissal

Cross Examining Witnesses in Disciplinary Hearings

Although unlikely to lack the theatrics of A Few Good Man in certain circumstances cross examination of witnesses may be an appropriate tactic.
Although likely to lack the theatrics of A Few Good Man in certain circumstances cross examination of witnesses may be an appropriate tactic.

In an Employment Tribunal hearing the cross examination of witnesses represents the majority of a disciplinary hearing. By contrast in a misconduct hearing of an employee the overwhelming majority of hearings will feature no cross examination of witnesses at all.

As was set out in R (Bonhoeffer) v General Medical Council in certain circumstances the refusal to allow an employee the right to cross examine would represent a denial of an employee’s right to a fair trial and amount to a breach of the their Article 6 ECHR rights. In practice though this is unlikely to apply to most disciplinary hearings and only where the right to practice their profession rather than just current job is at risk.

The ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures does not give an expectation that an employee must be allowed to call and cross examine an employee but it does go someway to suggesting that this may be appropriate. Paragraph 12 suggests that an employer:

The employee should be allowed to set out their case and answer any allegations that have been made.The employee should also be given a reasonable opportunity to ask questions, present evidence and call relevant witnesses. They should also be given an opportunity to raise points about any information provided by witnesses. Where an employer or employee intends to call relevant witnesses they should give advance notice that they intend to do this.

In my experience employees subject to misconduct proceedings do sometimes seize on the idea to cross examine an employee (usually an individual who who has made a grievance). I nearly always think this is a bad idea and thankfully have nearly always been successful in dissuading them. Many times the reason is simply some employees are incensed by what  has happening to them and the opportunity to vent some of that frustration seems an attractive one.

Other times the case against cross examination comes down to two issues. First, there is no independent verification and the allegation relies on one person’s word against another. In such cases I prefer to argue that in the circumstances (when an employee has a clean disciplinary record) and credibility has not been questioned in an investigation it is appropriate to give the benefit of the doubt following the advice in Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust v Roldan (paragraph 73) that:

The second point raised by this appeal concerns the approach of employers to allegations of misconduct where, as in this case, the evidence consists of diametrically conflicting accounts of an alleged incident with no, or very little, other evidence to provide corroboration one way or the other. Employers should remember that they must form a genuine belief on reasonable grounds that the misconduct has occurred. But they are not obliged to believe one employee and to disbelieve another. Sometimes the apparent conflict may not be as fundamental as it seems; it may be that each party is genuinely seeking to tell the truth but is perceiving events from his or her own vantage point. Even where that does not appear to be so, there will be cases where it is perfectly proper for the employers to say that they are not satisfied that they can resolve the conflict of evidence and accordingly do not find the case proved.

Second, there are cases where the credibility of the opposing side can be impugned with documentary evidence – which may or may not have been considered in the disciplinary investigation. In such circumstances I do not see what benefit it would be for the employee to cross examine the witness – the smoking gun is already in their hands and cross examining would only risk the value of the evidence being lessened by the opportunity to be explained.

However, employee representatives will want to know that if a cross examination is requested and an employee is refused, especially where the accusations or consequences are serious, then this may itself represent a ground for unfair dismissal (see TDG Chemicals Ltd v Benton). If nothing else, if you’re confident a request will be refused then asking for the right may itself give an employee a ground of appeal they would not otherwise have (but you risk having the request granted and then having no questions to ask).

Case References:

R (Bonhoeffer v General Medical Council [2011] EWHC 1585 (Admin)

TDG Chemical Ltd v Benton [2010] UKEAT 0166_10_1009

Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust v Roldan [2010] EWCA Civ 522

Trade Union Rules · Trade Unions

“Conference will decide”

PCS - Democracy Deferred

The common diversion from any debate about the suspension of elections is that “Conference will decide” and so there’s no point getting tangled up in the matter until then. But with the Standing Orders Committee report now online that big debate is finally in sight.

But what immediately strikes you, reading the motions in the opening general debate of Conference, is that the debate has been reduced to a purely theoretical question. Motion A1 asks that we endorse the NEC decision, while motion A2 asks that we censure it. But both accept that the suspension has happened and elections won’t be back until 2016, while laying out near identical actions to take the union forward. The reinstatement of this year’s elections isn’t even on the table.

Sure, motions A4 to A6 all call for the reinstatement of elections this year, but they’re not part of the general debate and won’t…

View original post 463 more words

Employment Appeal Tribunal · Equality Act 2010 · Indirect Discrimination · Race Discrimination

Tell Me the Reason Why

whyIt is not often there is an appeal judgement of genuine assistance to employees, but the EAT’s decision last year in Essop v Home Office is one such case in which my union, PCS, assisted the claimants in appealing.

The background is that the Respondent had a Provision, Criterion or Practice that an employee wishing to be promoted within the organisation must pass a Skills Assessment. Anyone who failed this assessment was barred from proceeding to the next stage of the recruitment process (i.e., interview). There was statistical evidence (that does not appear to be disputed) that BME candidates aged over 35 years of age were more likely to fail the assessment and, therefore, be excluded from promotion opportunities. The claimed disadvantage then was not just the failure of the test but the disadvantage in passing the test (which, in theory, would suggest a BME applicant aged over 35 who passed the test could still be at the particular disadvantage).

The claimants lodged employment tribunal proceedings alleging indirect discrimination on race and age grounds. At a preliminary hearing the disparate performance in  skills assessments was accepted but the employment judge ordered that the “[i]t will be necessary for each of the Claimants to prove the reason for his/her failing of the CSA test.”

Indirect discrimination occurs when

(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s.

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s if – (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage and (d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”

On the basis of this legislative language one can drill down the basic components of a indirect discrimination claim:

  1. The employer must apply a provision, criterion or practice (PCP); and
  2. That PCP must place (or would place) a particular protected characteristic (e.g., disabled staff) at a particular disadvantage; and
  3. The claimant must share that characteristic (e.g., must be disabled); and
  4. The complained of conduct cannot be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

The central issue before the EAT is summarised succinctly in paragraph 12 of the judgement:

12. EJ Baron found that the “particular disadvantage” within Section 19 which had been suffered in the present case was that there was an increased likelihood of an older BME candidate failing the CSA test. He accepted the Respondent’s case that it was not simply sufficient for the purposes of section 19(2)(b) and/or (c) to identify that this was the effect: he held the statute required the Claimants to prove on the balance of probabilities what was the reason for the lower pass rate. The Claimants disputed that they needed to show this.

The EAT ruled that in that direction the ET had made an error of law. In making the direction that he did the employment judge had gone beyond the statutory language.  The claimant had (by the Respondent’s concession) met the first three of the above requirements and all that was left was for the the employment tribunal to judge whether the Respondent’s conduct was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

Had it been allowed to go unchallenged the approach to indirect discrimination the first tier tribunal took would have significantly impeded the ability of claimants to challenge the discriminatory effect of employer practices that evidence showed to be discriminatory but with no clear rationale why. That the EAT has put paid to those arguments (for the time being at least) is good news for claimants. The case however has been appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Cases Cited: Essop v Home Office [2014] UKEAT 0480_13_1605

Disability · Employment Appeal Tribunal · Equality Act 2010 · Reasonable Adjustments

Is Diabetes Necessarily a Disability?

diabetesIf a person has type 2 Diabetes are they necessarily disabled under the Equality Act 2010?

This was the question considered by the Employment Appeals Tribunal in Metroline Travel Ltd v Stoute [2015] UKEAT 0302_14_2601. The claimant had type 2 diabetes but was not on medication for this but did control his condition by controlling his diet, this basically comprised of the claimant avoiding fizzy drinks. The first tier tribunal made reference to the statutory guidance on the definition of disability which it was obligated to have due regard to. In particular, the Tribunal considered paragraph B12 of that guidance (emphasis added):

The Act provides that, where an impairment is subject to treatment or correction, the impairment is to be treated as having a substantial adverse effect if, but for the treatment or correction, the impairment is likely to have that effect. In this context, ‘likely’ should be interpreted as meaning ‘could well happen’. The practical effect of this provision is that the impairment should be treated as having the effect that it would have without the measures in question (Sch1, Para 5(1)). The Act states that the treatment or correction measures which are to be disregarded for these purposes include, in particular, medical treatment and the use of a prosthesis or other aid (Sch1, Para 5(2)). In this context, medical treatments would include treatments such as counselling, the need to follow a particular diet, and therapies, in addition to treatments with drugs.

On the basis of that guidance the Tribunal determined at a preliminary hearing that the claimant’s avoidance of sugary drinks was “a particular diet” and, therefore, that the claimant was disabled for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010. However, the claimant was to lose the substantive hearing, and no appeal against that finding was made.   In the appeal judgement (which concerned only the statutory definition of disability) the judge disagreed; at paragraph 11 it was found that “abstaining from sugary drinks is sufficient to amount to a particular diet which therefore does not amount to treatment or correction.”

In coming to that view reference was also made to B7 of the statutory guidance, which states that a person may not be at impaired from carrying out normal day to day activities if they can reasonably amend their behaviour to avoid the impairment:

Account should be taken of how far a person can reasonably be expected to modify his or her behaviour, for example by use of a coping or avoidance strategy, to prevent or reduce the effects of an impairment on normal day-to-day activities. In some instances, a coping or avoidance strategy might alter the effects of the impairment to the extent that they are no longer substantial and the person would no longer meet the definition of disability. In other instances, even with the coping or avoidance strategy, there is still an adverse effect on the carrying out of normal day-to-day activities.

For example, a person who needs to avoid certain substances because of allergies may find the day-to-day activity of eating substantially affected. Account should be taken of the degree to which a person can reasonably be expected to behave in such a way that the impairment ceases to have a substantial adverse effect on his or her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.

In applying this paragraph the EAT also found (in addition to the finding that avoidance was not a particular diet that avoiding drinks such as Coca-Cola and Fruit Juices was a reasonable modification and that the normal day to day activity of eating and drinking did not have a substantial affect was not substantially affected (although how this was done without any regard to the personal circumstances of the (debarred) claimant I do not know. If you were a teetotal and unable to drink either a Coke or a Orange Juice because of Diabetes that does not leave much choice of liquid refreshment on an evening out! The effect of the avoidance may therefore be substantial, but this was ignored in the judgement.

Unfortunately, in Metroline there no opportunity for the Respondent (the claimant in the case) to put forward legal arguments and neither were there any representations (by the EHRC for example) made and so we are left with quite an unhelpful judgement. It seems a perverse decision to say avoidance of a particular very commonly consumed foodgroup is not “a particular diet” as the EAT said here; that would still leave the question of whether normal day to day activities were affected because avoidance was a reasonable modification which would be particular to the case in hand (but in the event was not considered).

Still, the judgement does throw into light the difficult question of what is reasonable modification; it is one I think there is very little guidance on for reps. It is also one prone for abuse by employers.  When making disability related complaints, particularly with conditions like diabetes, social anxiety, and stammering it would be worthwhile to spend a few moments considering whether there are modifications employers are likely to argue would be reasonable.

 

Employment Tribunal · Equality Act 2010 · Race Discrimination

Institutional Racism Lives On

PoliceIf UKIP are to be believed there is no longer a problem with racism in UK society, let alone in employment. On that basis the ‘we’re not racist but …’ UKIP are keen on the scrapping of race discrimination laws that provide some (marginal) legal protections for minority groups in the UK.

Over recent months the Police in the UK have appeared to be on a mission to prove UKIP wrong.

On the receiving end, there it is incontrovertible that the exercise of stop and search powers are disproportionately applied to BME citizens. This despite the recognition following the MacPherson Report that the Metropolitan Police were institutionally racist and the enactment of the Public Sector Equality Act.

A decade on and there have been attempts by the Conservative led government to scale back on these protections with the government encouraging public authorities that it should not complete equality impact assessments, removing the ability of Employment Tribunals to make recommendations to employers to eliminate future discrimination, and the attempted repeal of section 3 of the Equality Act 2006 against which PCS campaigned.

It was the racism of the Police revealed in the Stephen Lawrence case that provided such an impetus to the development of equality law. Over the last year we have seen that despite these advances there remain significant problems of racism within the Police; even within the way it treats its own employees there have been clear pockets of racism.

In a highly publicised judgement last September the former PC Carol Howard found the Met Police and racially discriminated against her and then proceeded to victimise her for challenging that behaviour. In their award of compensation the Tribunal also made the rare step of awarding aggravated damages which can be given only where an employer has acted “in a high-handed, malicious, insulting or oppressive way“. Predictably, in the aftermath there were claims that this was ‘an isolated instance’. Similar claims were made months later when PC Ricky Haruna won another tribunal for Racism of senior officers.

Less than a year later another Police force has again been found to discriminated against a PC on the ground of race. Ronnie Lungu is a PC in the Wiltshire Police Service – a Tribunal found last week that senior officers had intentionally downgraded internal appraisals to ensure he would not gain a promotion. The Tribunal found

The reduction in the scoring has the very significant effect in terms of making it appear reasonable that the one black applicant for promotion was scoring lower than the 19 white applicants and should therefore not be promoted … This behaviour is so extreme that the tribunal cannot think of any apparent motive other than one that is directly related to [the] claimant’s race.”

Bad_Egg
The ‘bad egg’ defense discriminatory employers invariably use just will not wash in the case of the Police.

In short, because Mr Lungu was black senior officers blocked his promotion and, as the tribunal also found, failed to take adequate action when colleagues had made racist remarks.

As the principal organ through which the rules of the land are upheld it is right that the public should expect the Police to perform their duties diligently irrespective of race. Over 20 years after the murder of the Stephen Lawrence and the  light the ensuing inquiry shone on the dark recesses of police prejudice it appears the institutional racism of the UK police lives on, at least when it concerns how our custodians of law and order treat its own black and minority ethnic employees.

As any trade union rep knows for every one employee willing to take a discrimination employment tribunal against their employer there are at least 10 who are too scared, and that is not inclusive of those put off by employment tribunal fees. These cases then, are just the tip of an iceberg.

And so, at the time that Conservatives desire cutting anti-discrimination safeguards in employment in the name of cutting red tape, and UKIP want to scrap race discrimination laws themselves the evidence in the Police service – the racism of which prompted these safeguards in the first place – strongly suggests that while there may have been improvements the work is a long, long way from completion. In parts at least, racism lives on in the UK’s police forces; the UK needs more safeguards and meaningful protections, not less.